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Extended	abstract	
Temporary	Help	Agencies	(THA)	bring	into	the	labor	market	a	new	fundamental	feature.	They	
are	 intermediaries	 on	 a	 market	 which	 is	 modeled	 as	 decentralized	 by	 the	 dominant	 theoretical	
framework,	search	theory.	This	theory	explains	the	flows	of	hires	by	the	individual	search	by	workers	
and	employers	and	ensuing	matches.	THA	bring	some	centralization	in	this	framework.	If	agents	are	
moved	by	self	interest,	some	should	create	such	agencies,	since	they	lower	search	costs	through	the	
benefits	of	specialization,	and	can	earn	profits.	Introducing	intermediaries	is	then	a	necessity	to	give	
the	search	model	more	coherent	microfoundations.	THA	are	not	the	only	intermediaries	in	the	real	
labor	market.	Many	 countries	 have	 a	 national	 placement	 agency	 paid	 by	 the	 tax	 payers.	 However	
THA	do	not	only	match,	they	are	the	legal	employers	of	the	workers,	and	the	contract	is	therefore	a	
particular	 contract,	 different	 from	 the	 standard	 Fixed	 Term	 Contracts	 (FTC).	 Then	 THA	 propose	
contracts	which	involve	a	mark	up	on	wages,	and	which	are	competed	by	the	standard	FTC,	implying	
search	costs	for	the	employing	firm.	The	two	types	of	contracts	are	substitutes	and	their	coexistence		
is	not	obvious.		
Moreover	temporary	help	jobs	have	important	consequences	for	the	labor	market	outcomes.	
THA	select	the	workers	for	the	client	firm,	and	can	gain	precise	information	since		they	evaluate	the	
same	worker	often	for	a	new	contract.	Moreover	it	appears	to	be	commun	practice	that	they	provide	
the	worker	with	 the	 training	needed	 for	 the	 job	 in	 the	 client	 firm,	 since	 the	 short	 duration	of	 the	
contract	 would	make	 it	 too	 costly.	 A	 consequence	 is	 that	 temporary	 help	 workers,	 beyond	 being	
selected	 among	 condidates,	 gain	 human	 capital	 and	 also	 some	 experience	 on	 these	 jobs,	 three	
factors	 that	 may	 act	 as	 stepping	 stones	 for	 a	 future	 Open	 Ended	 Contract	 (OEC).	 However	
terminations	 rarely	 lead	 to	 an	 immediate	 OEC	 and	 short	 durations	 send	 most	 of	 the	 workers	
repeatedly	 into	unemployment,	delaying	integration	into	OEC.	Several	major	questions	can	then	be	
tackled	by	the	introduction	of	a	THA	in	a	model	of	the	labor	market.	In	this	first	paper	on	the	topic,	
we	will	 study	three.	First	we	will	 show	that	a	calibrated	model	displays	 the	coexistence	of	 the	two	
types	 of	 contracts,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 presence	 of	 OEC.	 Second	 we	 will	 study	 the	 efficiency	 that	 the	
temporary	 help	 contracts	 can	 bring	 to	 a	 labor	 market,	 notably	 in	 terms	 of	 unemployment	 and	
vacancies.	Third	we	will	analyse	the	consequences	for	the	carreers	of	young	workers.	Are	temporary	
help	jobs	a	stepping	stones	or	traps,	and	for	whom	?		
In	order	to	carry	this	analysis	which	is	novel	in	the	literature,	we	introduce	a	THA	in	WorkSim,	
a	large	Agent	Based	Model	of	the	French	labor	market,	with	10,000	agents,	which	involves	a	scale	of	
1/4700.	 It	 is	 calibrated	 by	 the	 CMA-ES	 algorithm	 which	 sets	 63	 parameters	 to	 fit	 optimally	 67	
aggregated	variables	(measured	for	the	year	2014).	Goudet,	Kant	&	Ballot,	(2016)	give	a	description	
of	 the	 first	 version	 of	 the	 model.	 The	 current	 version	 	 (Ballot,	 Kant	 &	 Goudet	 2015)	 adds	 the	
endogenization	 of	 	 the	 choice	 between	 Fixed	 Term	 Contracts	 (FTC)	 and	 OEC,	 based	 on	 the	 total	
expected	 costs	 of	 each	 type	 of	 contract	 and	 anticipations	 by	 the	 firms	 on	 their	 own	 demand.	We	
then	give	to	the	FTC	a	role	of	buffer.	The	decisions	of	the	agents	are	based	on	search	theory,	albeit	in	
a	bounded	rational	context.	This	is	justified	on	cognitive	ground	but	also	by	the	complexity	of	a	labor	
market	 marked	 by	 the	 heterogeneity	 of	 our	 agents.	 Search	 theory	 allows	 to	 distinguish	 inactive	
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workers	and	unemployed	who	search	for	a	job,	according	to	the	ILO	definition.	It	also	enables	us	to	
introduce	on-the-job	search,	an	essential	behavior	on	labor	markets.	In	spite	of	bounded	rationality	
agents	do	intertemporal	calculations.	
The	model	considers	the	states	of	unemployment,	employment	in	OEC	and	in		FTC,	schooling,	
inactivity,	retirement,	civil	servants.	The	decisions	generate	a	complete	gross	flows	system	which	 is	
consistent,	 since	 the	 individuals	age	and	stay	 in	 the	model	until	 their	death.	The	unit	period	 is	 the	
week,	allowing	to	account	for	short	contract	and	unemployment	spells,	and	avoid	the	biases	induced	
by	descriptions	of	the	labor	market	based	on	transition	statistics.	The	institutions	of	the	labor	law	are	
implemented,	 such	 as	 firing	 costs,	 advance	 notice,	 grace	 period,	 among	 others.	 These	 costs	
expectations	are	taken	into	account	in	the	calculations	of	the	firms.	
The	 results	 of	 the	present	paper	 show	 that,	 first,	 the	 three	 types	of	 contracts	 coexist,	 and	
that	the		statistics	for	their	relative	weights	of	the	contracts	fit	the	facts.	The	simulated	share	of	the	
temporary	 help	 jobs	 in	 employment	 is	 3.3%	 (real:	 3.7%),	 and	 the	 simulated	 share	 of	 FTC	 is	 15.0%	
(real:	 13%).	 The	 recruitment	 rates	 by	 age	 group	 are	 well	 reproduced.	 We	 then	 reproduce	
approximately	 the	 enormous	 flow	 of	 hires	 in	 temporary	 help	 contracts	:	 12,245,000	 	 (real	:	
15,400,000)	 and	 the	 13,936,000	 FTC	 signed	 (real	:19,673,000	 according	 to	 the	 ACOSS	 which	
overestimates	 by	 some	 5	 to	 10%,	 and	 8,428,000	 according	 to	 the	 DARES/DMMO	which	 does	 not	
register	 the	 contracts	 under	 6	 months),	 and	 finally	 1,940,000	 OEC	 (real	:	 2,962,000	 according	 to	
ACOSS	and	1,651,000	according	to	the	DARES/DMMO	stats)	.	
Second	 a	 variant	 suppresses	 the	 THA,	 and	measures	 the	 outcomes.	 In	 the	 short	 run	 	 (one	
year)	employers	replace	the	temporary	help	contracts	by	FTC	(but	only	half	of	them).	Then	they	start,	
to	 substitute	 these	supplementary	FTC	by	OEC	since	 	 temporary	help	contracts	were	used	 for	 jobs	
which	required	training,	the	cost	of	which	was	paid	by	THA,	and	FTC	do	not	allow	for	amortization.	
However	 232,000	 jobs	 are	 not	 replaced	 after	 15	 years.	 	 The	 young	people	 suffer	more	 since	 their	
unemployment	rises	by	4	points.	Vacancies	rise	by	22%.	Production	and	profit	decrease	also.	
Third	we	do	 the	equivalent	of	a	natural	experiment	by	 following	a	 cohort	of	 young	people	
between	15	and	25	(summing	200	simulations)	with	and	without	the	presence	of	the	THA.	Workers	
on	average	obtain	more	training	with	THA	presence	and	this	results	 in	a	faster	progression	of	their	
salaries.	Finally	those	workers	who	have	held	temporary	help	jobs	are	more	likely	to	be	in	an	OEC	a	
year	 after	 than	 those	who	 have	 been	 unemployed,	 a	 fact	 observed	 in	 France	 by	 Flamand	 (2016).	
Temporary	help	jobs	then	appear	as	being	a	stepping	stone	for	the	incumbents.		
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